Weaponizing People as Nonmilitary Instruments of Cross-Domain Coercion
A widely held belief in deterrence theory, first articulated by Thomas Schelling, is that compellence is harder than deterrence. This chapter finds, however, that weak actors have often been able to successfully use coercive engineered migration to compel stronger states to alter their policies. The aims of coercive engineered migration vary tremendously and usually include political, military, and economic goals. Liberal democracies are especially vulnerable to this particular means of coercion, even as they have important advantages in other arenas. This novel example of compellence that relies on a nonmilitary form of cross-domain coercion shows very convincingly that a difference in means in the right context can have a major differential effect on the success or failure of coercion.
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