The Analytic Potential of Cross-Domain Deterrence
This concluding chapter provides an analytical summary of insights that emerge across the chapters, highlighting the ways in which the characteristics of different instruments of coercion examined in this book—nuclear weapons, operations on land, at sea, in the air, in space, and in cyberspace, and engineered migrations—can improve or undermine deterrence. By and large, the contributors to this book find that the notion of cross-domain deterrence is useful and can reveal novel insights that traditional deterrence theory obscures. Deterrence in history has often occurred across domains, combining land and naval power as well as force, diplomacy, and economic statecraft, but the logic of strategic choice has not been articulated. Deterrence theory as we know it may actually be a subset of cross-domain deterrence, an account of coercive bargaining that takes means as seriously as ends. Means matter because different tools and combinations of tools have different consequences for the costs, credibility, and consequences of deterrence. These insights opens up new research frontiers for international relations.
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