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U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition$
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Banks Miller and Brett Curry

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780190928247

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190928247.001.0001

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Political Responsiveness and Career Prospects

Political Responsiveness and Career Prospects

(p.127) 7 Political Responsiveness and Career Prospects
U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition

Banks Miller

Brett Curry

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers the relationship between performance as a U.S. Attorney (USA) and subsequent career prospects. Results indicate that adherence to presumed partisan preferences relates to the likelihood of both promotion within the executive branch and nomination to the federal bench. USA performance is less likely to matter for positions such as entering private practice, over which national principals have little control. These results underscore an alternative mechanism under which shirking by federal prosecutors may be punished. Additionally, we find that ideological distance from the President is a potent predictor of the probability of nomination to the federal courts but has no association with elevation within the executive branch.

Keywords:   United States Attorney, federal judge, judicial nominations, political ambition, bureaucratic ambition, legal practice

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