Rules of the Innovation Commons
Rules of the Innovation Commons
This chapter examines the basic institutional similarities between innovation commons (as a species of knowledge commons) and the eight core design principles, or rules of the commons, that Ostrom discovered. It explores the innovation commons through the lens of these rules that enable a group to form under uncertainty, and that make cooperation a safe and effective strategy within that group. The question is explored in terms of the core problems a commons must solve: identity, cooperation, consent, monitoring, punishment, and independence. The chapter then examines these rules in the broader context of multilevel selection theory, arguing that group selection operates over innovation.
Keywords: rules of the commons, cooperation, uncertainty, multilevel selection theory, Elinor Ostrom
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