Defending Frenemies examines the nonproliferation strategies that the United States pursued toward vulnerable and often obstreperous allies in three volatile regions of the globe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, from the early 1960s to the early 1990s. It presents a historical and comparative analysis of how successive US presidential administrations (those of John F. Kennedy to George H. W. Bush) employed inducements and coercive diplomacy toward Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan over nuclear proliferation. Building upon neoclassical realism, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro argues t ... More

Defending Frenemies examines the nonproliferation strategies that the United States pursued toward vulnerable and often obstreperous allies in three volatile regions of the globe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, from the early 1960s to the early 1990s. It presents a historical and comparative analysis of how successive US presidential administrations (those of John F. Kennedy to George H. W. Bush) employed inducements and coercive diplomacy toward Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan over nuclear proliferation. Building upon neoclassical realism, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro argues that regional power dynamics and US domestic politics shaped the types of nonproliferation strategies pursued. The overriding goals of successive administrations were to contain the growth of the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East and South Asia, as well as to enlist China as an ally of convenience against the Soviets in East Asia. Weaker allies’ nuclear proliferation could facilitate or complicate the realization of those goals. When policymakers perceived an unfavorable regional power distribution and short-time horizons for emerging threats to US interests, they were inclined to pursue accommodative strategies toward an ally. Conversely, when they perceived a favorable regional power distribution and longer time horizons for threats, they were inclined to pursue coercive nonproliferation strategies toward an ally. However, congressional opposition to certain arms transfers and to nonproliferation legislation sometimes led administrations to pursue hybrid strategies—combining coercive and accommodating elements—toward nuclear proliferating allies.