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Surrounding Self-Control$

Alfred R. Mele

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780197500941

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197500941.001.0001

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(p.457) Index

(p.457) Index

Source:
Surrounding Self-Control
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may, on occasion, appear on only one of those pages.

Tables and figures are indicated by t and f following the page number

Adams, R., 412–14
addiction
acceptance and, 206
chemical-physical components of, 219–20
diachronic control and, 157
distinction between wanting and liking and, 247
Frankfurt on, 221, 423, 424
free will and, 423, 424, 430, 431–32
impersonal self-knowledge and, 156, 157
“maturing out” of, 155
triggers and, 247–48
agency
energy and, 29
metacognitive beliefs and, 191, 195–98
moral responsibility and, 400–1, 405–11
narrative capacity and, 145
self-control and, 189, 194–98
Ainslie, G.
on bad decisions, 1–2
on free will and intertemporal bargaining, 12–13, 421–22, 425–29, 430, 431–32
on precommiting devices, 152–53
on sequential choice problems, 368
akrasia (weakness of will). See also willpower
argument for the impossibility of, 83
Aristotle on, 445
best-reasoned actions blocked by, 82–83
evaluation versus motivation considerations regarding, 84
forgetfulness and, 85–86
gift giving example and, 387, 392, 393
hateful neighbors example and, 388, 392, 393
intentions and, 385
irresoluteness and, 84–86
prima facie judgments versus all-out judgments in evaluating, 83–84
procrastination and, 85–86
pure regard and, 387–89, 393
regard akrasia and, 392–93
self-control contrasted with, 2, 82–83, 385–87
alienation
defeatism and, 208
passivity and, 208
repression and, 207–8
self-identification and, 204
struggle and, 208, 221–22
temptation and, 7, 205–6, 206f, 207–9, 211, 212–16, 214f, 218, 219, 220, 221–22
Alquist, L., 25
Amaya, S., 416
appraisal, 154, 183–84, 246–47
Aristotle
on akrasia, 445
on moderation, 363
on narrative meaning in Mitys story, 143
on self-control and rational calculations, 363
self-control as a character virtue for, 361
on self-control’s origins, 1–2, 83, 166
on young people’s strong passions, 334
Aron, A.R., 106, 109
Ayduk, O., 367–68, 440–41
(p.458) Baker, N., 369
Baumeister, R.F.
on criticisms of ego-depletion model, 29–30
on ego-depletion and decision-making, 19–20
on ego-depletion and glucose levels, 24
on ego-depletion and pain, 24–25
on ego-depletion and self-control, 27
on emotions and self-control, 119
on meta-cognitive acts, 221
on planning and willpower, 22
on the valence-centered path to self-control, 126, 127
Bluck, S., 146–47, 148
Boyer, P., 446–47
Bratman, M., 84–85, 320–21, 328–29, 330
Brekke, N.C., 303–4
Brink, D., 351–52
Broome, J., 377–78, 379
Buch, E.R., 108–9, 110–11
Cannon, C., 336
Carnevale, J.J., 74
Carruthers, G., 195–96
Carter, E.C., 38
Carver, C.S., 103, 119, 131, 133, 134
Casey, B., 346–47
Chang, R., 280
Chernyak, N., 52
children. See also juvenile responsibility
empathy among, 159–60
intuitions about free will among, 47–48, 49t, 50, 53
memory and, 142–43
narrative capacity and, 5, 145, 148, 150–51, 155, 157–58, 160
self-control and, 5, 142, 150–51, 157–58, 160, 180
Cialdini, R.B., 279
cigarettes. See under temptation
Coates, D. J., 349, 350
cognitive dissonance, 19–20, 246n2
Cohen, G., 184
construal level theory (CLT), 71–72, 74–75
coordination
construal levels and, 73–74
question of true intentions and, 75
self-control viewed as a function of, 4, 65, 70–75
whole versus part dynamics and, 70–71, 73, 75
criminal law, 8, 334–35, 337–38, 351–54
cultural origins of beliefs regarding self-control
Cameroon and, 60
China and, 51–52, 53, 57f, 59–61
cognitive development scores and, 58–59
Germany and, 60
independently minded versus interdependently minded cultures and, 51, 60
inhibitory control tasks as a means of measuring, 53–61
Korea and, 59–60
Nepal and, 52, 59–60
Peru and, 52–53, 59–60, 61
Singapore and, 51, 52, 57f, 59–61
United States and, 3–4, 50, 51–53, 56–57, 57f, 59–61
Dang, J., 38
D’Arms, J., 123
Davidson, D., 83–84
decision-making
attention and, 184
best judgments and, 166, 167–68, 170–71, 172, 175–76, 178–81, 320
deliberation and, 167–68, 170–71, 172–73, 183–84
ego-depletion and, 3, 19–21, 24, 29
intentions and, 164–65, 166, 168–70, 173–74, 179
memory and, 20
mental effort and, 182–83
perspective-taking and, 184
pre-commitments to criteria for, 184
self-control and, 6, 19–20, 164–85
uncertainty and, 6, 169, 172–73
Delgado, M.R., 183–84
deliberate ignorance
cognitive stability and, 295
definition of, 294
epistemic diligence and, 9–10, 293–94
epistemic justice and, 308–9
(p.459) epistemic responsibility and, 298–99
epistemic restraint and, 9–10, 293–94, 300–9
ethical responsibility and, 9–10, 293–94
forward-looking epistemic discretion and, 301, 309
impartiality-enhancing exposure control and, 302–8
impartiality-enhancing ignorance and, 9–10, 293–95, 297–98, 308, 309
introspection illusion and, 303–8, 309
Nazi Era and, 296–97
partiality-preserving ignorance and, 9–10, 293–97, 308–9
present-centered epistemic vigilance and, 300–1, 309
“veil of ignorance” model (Rawls) and, 298
De Motu Animalium (Aristotle), 1–2
Dennett, D., 401
De Ridder, D., 27
de Silveira, C., 148
Dewey, J., 120
dieting. See under temptation
divided mind model
automatic versus deliberative elements in, 67, 68–69, 71
conceptual challenges to, 70
emotion and, 5, 116, 138
empirical challenges to, 68–70, 71
hot versus cool systems in, 67–68, 69–70, 71
question of true intentions and, 70
self-control and, 4, 67–70, 74, 130
temptation and, 67, 69
doctrine of double effect, 289
Doris, J., 416
dorsal premotor cortex (PMd), 112
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), 110, 369–70, 371
Duckworth, A.L., 154
ego-depletion
criticisms of the theory of, 29–30, 32–43, 88–89, 249
decision-making and, 3, 19–21, 24, 29
fragmentation of the mind and, 248–50
glucose levels and, 23–24
interpersonal conflict and, 3, 25
memory and, 20
meta-analysis of studies of, 37–43, 88
origins of the term, 17
pain and, 24–25
passivity and, 3, 21–22
physical energy and, 3, 23
planning and, 22–23
rationality impacted by, 19
replication issues regarding the study of, 32–37, 41, 249
scientific evidence demonstrating, 17–18
self-control and, 24, 27–28, 29, 41, 204–5, 248–49
uncertainty and, 3, 25–26
willpower and, 3, 17–18, 28
emotion
control precedence and, 120–21, 123–24
divided mind model and, 5, 116, 138
enlightening self-realizations and, 135–38
escape from self-awareness and, 128–29
evaluation-centered path to self-control and, 124, 128–29
evaluative tradition of research and, 121–23
executive regulation and, 121, 123, 125, 127–28
expected emotions and, 134
feeling tradition of research and, 118–20, 122
fittingness regulation and, 123, 136–37
goal achievement progress reports and, 131–34
goal-centered path to self-control and, 124, 125–26, 129–30
gut feelings and, 135
hedonic regulation and, 119, 123, 126, 127–28
immediate emotions and, 134
“mood repair” and, 126–28
motivation and, 5, 82, 120–21
passivity and, 124–25
perceptualist account of, 122–23
recalcitrance to reason and, 124–25, 136–37
(p.460) self-control and, 2–3, 5, 26–27, 69–70, 116, 119, 123–38, 260–61
self-evaluation and, 5
teleosemantic approach to, 122–23
tempting proximal goals and, 124–26
valence-centered path to self-control, 124, 126–28, 129, 131–34
empathy
cognitive empathy and, 390–91
depletion objection regarding, 394–96
emotional empathy and, 390–92
epistemic objection regarding, 393–94
the future self and, 384–85, 395–96
gift giving example and, 394
hateful neighbors example and, 388, 393
narrative capacity and, 143
prudential self-control and, 384–85
pure disregard and, 389–90
pure regard and, 389–90, 394
rational self-control and, 385–87, 395, 396–97
volitional self-control and, 12, 386–87, 395–97
End of History Illusion, 246
Engel, C., 293, 294–95
Fischer, J., 153, 339, 348, 350
Fivush, R., 148
Förster, J., 72
Frankfurt, H.
on addiction, 221, 423, 424
on alienation, 207–8
on free will, 12, 421–25, 428–29, 431–32
on identification and the self, 3, 204, 216
on meta-cognitive acts, 221
on temptation, 205–6
on wantonness, 154–55, 158–59, 423, 430
free will
addiction and, 423, 424, 430, 431–32
Ainslie on intertemporal bargaining and, 12–13, 421–22, 425–29, 430, 431–32
children’s intuitions regarding, 47–48, 49t, 50, 53
delay discount functions and, 426–27
first-order versus second-order volition and, 422–25, 427–28, 429–32
Frankfurt’s structural account of, 12, 421–25, 428–29, 431–32
prisoner’s dilemma tests and, 428
self-control and, 11, 190–91, 421
willpower and, 20–21, 22–23
Freud, S., 245–46
Friedman, N.P., 342–43
Friedrich, J., 304–5, 306–7
Friese, M., 38–40
Fujita, K., 74, 117
Gailliot, M., 23
Galinsky, A., 184
Gallagher, S., 437
Gollwitzer, P.M., 275
Graham v. Florida, 335
Greenberg, D., 144–45
Habermas, T., 146–47, 148
Haffner, S., 296
Hagger, M.S., 35–38, 88
Haidt, J., 262
Hare, R.D., 83
Hart, H.L.A., 339, 349
Hayenhjelm, M., 284
Heilman, R.M., 183–84
Henderson, M.D., 73
Herdova, M., 102
Hertwig, R., 293, 294–95
Hofmann, W., 26–27, 259
Holroyd, J., 298–99
Holton, R., 84–86, 90, 280, 442
Hutto, D., 145, 149–50
hybrid skills of self-control
automatic motor control and, 95–96, 97–98
executive control processes and, 95–96
intellectualist versus anti-intellectualist conceptions of skill and, 91
intentional self-distraction and, 94–95
mental time travel and, 95
“natural gifts” conception of skill and, 92
normative control and, 93
situational control and, 92–93, 94–95
(p.461) strategic control and, 93–94
“System 1” versus “System 2” models of cognitive processing and, 4, 90–91
Imhoff, R., 249
inhibitory control
definition of, 104–5
neural plasticity in the motor cortex and, 110–13
right inferior frontal cortex (rIFC) and, 106–11, 113
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and, 107–9, 110–11, 113
ventral premotor cortex and, 106–13
intentions
commitments and, 318–19, 320–21
cooperation and, 328–32
decision-making and, 164–65, 166, 168–70, 173–74, 179
deliberation and, 320–22, 323, 325
desires’ conflict with, 317–19, 320–21, 323, 324, 325–26, 328
felt authority of, 326, 327–29, 332
first-person perspective and, 321–24
the self and, 319–20
self-control and, 10, 178, 179, 193, 315, 316–18, 332
self-evaluation and, 322–25, 326–27
values and, 318–20
Jackson v. Hobbs, 335
James, W., 89–90, 119
Jaworska, A., 158, 159–60
Job, V., 191
Johnen, V.M., 112
juvenile responsibility
adolescence and, 342–43, 345–48, 349–51, 352
executive functions in the brain and, 10, 338–39, 342–44, 345, 346–47, 348, 349–52
in infancy through preschool, 343
juvenile justice system and, 8, 334–35, 351–54
minimal working set concept and, 339–40, 342, 349, 351
peer influence susceptibility and, 347–48, 350–51
prefrontal cortex and, 10, 344, 345–46
punishment and, 335–36
scalar measures of responsibility and, 348–51
in school-aged preadolescence, 344–45, 352
Kagan, E., 335–36
Kavka, G.S., 167–68
Kennedy, A., 335
Kennett, J., 89–90, 146, 151, 158–59, 316, 440–41
Kesebir, S., 262
Kitayama, S., 51
Kitcher, P., 252
Kotabe, H.P., 267–68
Kugler, M.B., 305–6
Kushnir, T., 47–49
Kwan, D., 442–43
Lerner, J. S., 278
Levy, N., 88–91, 155–58
Liberman, N., 72
Locke, J., 151
MacCoon, D.G., 440–41
Magen, E., 370–71
Mann, T., 184
Markus, H.R., 51
Martin, L.N., 183–84
Matthews, S., 146, 151, 158–59, 440–41
McGoey, L., 293
McIntyre, A., 84, 85–86, 93–94
McKenna, M., 403–4
Mele, A.
on decision-making, 164–65, 179
on evaluation versus motivation, 84
on evaluative commitments to action, 166
on the evolution of moral responsibility, 341–42
on intentional self-deception, 297
on precommiting devices, 152–53
on self-control and motivation, 81, 316
on self-control versus weakness of will, 363, 385
mental partitioning, 245–46
(p.462) mental time travel
attentional deployment and, 151–52, 440–41
autonoetic consciousness and, 146, 438–39, 445–46
definition of, 438
episodic memory and, 438, 439, 445–46
knowledge of desired self and, 151–52
pre-experiencing and, 445–46
psychopaths’ inability to engage in, 158–59
self-control and, 13, 151, 159–60, 440–43, 447
temporal discounting rates and, 442–43
the temporally extended self and, 436–37, 439–40, 444–46, 447
temptation, 13, 435, 440–42, 445, 446
mere exposure effect, 246–47
Metcalfe, J., 119, 125, 130
Milgram studies, 35
Miller v. Alabama, 335–36, 347
Mischel, W.
on “cool cognitive system” versus “hot emotional system,” 119, 125, 130, 369
delay of gratification studies by, 1–2, 65, 90, 94–95, 180, 244–45, 341, 367–69
Miyake, A., 342–43
Molden, D.C., 24
Monahan, K.C., 345–46
Mooijman, M., 265–66, 267
Moore, B., 369
morality
agency cultivation model and, 400–1, 405–11
attributionist accounts of, 411–15
authority/subversion foundation and, 263–64, 268–69
capacitarian responses and, 404, 416
care/harm foundation and, 263
control-based accounts of, 401–2, 403
definitions of, 261
desert-entailing judgments and, 406, 413
failures of reaction and, 403
fairness/reciprocity foundation and, 263
freedom and, 268–69
group-oriented processes and, 266, 267
loyalty/betrayal foundation and, 263, 268–69
mood disorders and, 415
Moral Foundations Theory and, 262–64
moral pluralism and, 259, 262
narrative capacity and, 160
non-volitional culpability and, 400, 401–4, 411, 415
performance errors and, 416
purity/degradation foundation and, 264, 268–69
reasons accounts of, 401, 411, 418
reasons-responsiveness views and, 417–18
self-control and, 8–9, 259, 260–62, 264–70
shame and guilt as factors in, 267–68
Sidgwickian capacities and, 408–10
social self-regulation and, 406–7
tracing responses and, 403–7
volitional impairments and, 401–2
Morse, S., 337
Moskowitz, G., 184
motivation
aspiration and, 9
“belief route” versus “feeling route” regarding, 97
context and, 153–54
distal versus proximal forms of, 65–66, 67, 69
expectancy and, 96–98
goals versus temptations and, 206f, 260
“hot forces” and, 81, 82, 86, 96
Hume and, 11
penalty-imposing contracts and, 9
self-control and, 2, 65–66, 81–82, 85–86, 95–97, 178, 203–4, 227, 260, 316
self-regulation and, 228–29
social accountability strategies and, 9, 275
Musil, R., 252
narrative capacity
agency and, 145
autobiographical memory and, 144–45, 146
caring and, 158–60
children and, 5, 145, 148, 150–51, 155, 157–58, 160
cognitive change and, 154
context and, 153–55
(p.463) definition of, 143–45
development of, 148
diachronic control and, 157
empathy and, 143
global coherence and, 146–47, 148
intelligibility and, 143
knowledge of desired self and, 151–53
knowledge of effective personal strategies and, 150–51, 155–57
landscapes of action and, 148
life story model of identity and, 146–47
meaning-making and, 143–44
mental time travel and, 158–59
metaphysical identity and, 147
moral responsibility and, 160
narrative reasoning and, 144
self-control and, 5, 142–43, 149–60
temptation and, 149–50
Nausea (Sartre), 143–44
Navon, D., 72
negligence
agency and, 400–1, 405–11
control-based accounts of morality and, 401–2, 403
desert-entailing judgments and, 406, 413
non-volitional culpability and, 400, 401–4, 411, 415
Sidgwickian capacities and, 408–10
social self-regulation and, 406–7
tracing responses and, 403–7
Nelkin, D.K., 351
Nelson, K., 148
neurolaw, 335, 337–38, 353–54
Nosek, B.A., 31, 33
Nozick, R., 380
Paglieri, F., 434
Parfit, D., 436–37
Pascal, B., 137
Piccinini, G., 103
Pickard, H., 155
The Picture of Dorian Grey (Wilde), 250
placebo brain stimulation, 191–98
Plato, 381
Pocheptsova, A., 20
Poetics (Aristotle), 143
primary motor cortex (M1), 107–9, 110–14
Prinz, J., 122–23
Proctor, R., 293
Pronin, E., 302–3, 305–6
Ravizza, M., 339, 348, 350
Rawls, J., 263, 298
Raz, J., 412
right inferior frontal cortex (rIFC), 106–11, 113
right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), 106, 110
Roper v. Simmons, 335–36, 337, 347
Rosati, C., 143
Roskies, A., 338
Rozin, P., 266–67
Rubin, D., 144–45
Sartre, J.-P., 143–44
Savage, L., 378–79
Scanlon, T. M., 389–90, 412
Schachter, S., 22
Schechtman, M., 147, 153–54
Scheier, M. F., 119, 131, 133, 134
Schiebinger, L.L., 293
Schmeichel, B. J., 19, 20
Schweiger-Gallo, I., 135
self-control
action loop versus affect loop in, 131–32
avoidance versus approach orientations toward, 66, 95
“cold” automatic routines as potential obstacle to, 86
collectivism and, 268, 269
commitment-based views of, 165–66, 170–71, 176–82, 185
construal levels and, 73–75
control beliefs and, 6–7, 190–91, 193–94, 195–96, 203–4
dares and, 319–20
decompositional analysis of, 103–4
definitions of, 65–66, 102–3, 116–18, 189, 227, 260–61, 316, 434
diachronic control and, 155–58
divided mind model and, 4, 67–70, 74, 130
dual-systems model of, 88–91
dynamic choice and, 362–64
ego-depletion and, 17–18
(p.464) errant self-control and, 317
executive control and, 81–82, 86, 95–96
frame-sensitive reasoning and, 11, 367–82
gift giving example and, 387, 393
glucose levels and, 23–24
goal-setting versus goal-shielding in, 117, 129–31
guilt and, 134
happiness and, 26–27, 384
implementation-intentions and, 94, 135, 193
individualism and, 269
inhibition and, 75, 105–6
interpersonal conflict and, 27–28
memory and, 142–43
muscle analogy regarding, 18
narrative capacity and, 5, 142–43, 149–60
non-commitment self-control and, 6, 174–82, 185
occurrent versus potential impulses and, 434–35, 446–47
placebo suggestions and, 191–98
political conservatism and, 268
proactive self-control and, 116–17
proximal goals versus important goals in, 117–18
reactive self-control and, 116–17, 124
religiosity and, 268
self-knowledge and, 86–87, 93–94, 155–56
self-regulation compared to, 66–67, 117, 227, 240, 241
sequential choice and, 11, 361–71
strength model of, 87–88, 89
success associated with, 26
volitional versus rational forms of, 11–12
as whole versus part problem, 70–71, 73, 75
willpower and, 2–3, 87–88
self-governance
agency and, 400–1, 405–11
control-based accounts of morality and, 401–2, 403
desert-entailing judgments and, 406, 413
non-volitional culpability and, 400, 401–4, 411, 415
Sidgwickian capacities and, 408–10
social self-regulation and, 406–7
tracing responses and, 403–7
self-regulation
as achievement for its own sake, 228–32, 240, 241
active involvement and, 225–26
axiological implications of, 7–8, 228
being at one with oneself and, 236–40, 241
ethics of mental life and, 228
goals and, 225, 226
good ways of shaping one’s own mental life and, 233–34, 240
mental integration and, 234–36, 240–41
motivation and, 228–29
reflexivity and, 236–37, 239
remotely instrumental value of, 232–33, 240
self-alienation and, 236–37
self-control and, 66–67, 117, 227, 240, 241
sequential choice problems
commitment timing and, 362
delay discount functions and, 365, 366f, 426–27
delay of gratification paradigm and, 367–69
dual processing cognitive-affect systems and, 367–68
framing effects and, 367–82
hidden zeroes paradigm and, 369–71
rationality and, 375–82
small word frameworks and, 378–79
ultra-intensional contexts and, 376–77, 380–81
weakness of will and, 365–66, 366f
Sheeran, P., 22
Shoemaker, D., 414–15, 416
Sjastad, H., 22, 34
Skinner, B. F., 2
Skrynka, J., 24
Slote, M., 413
Smart, J.J.C., 414
Smith, A., 412, 414–16, 417–18
(p.465) social accountability strategies
adjustments to the self versus adjustments to the environment and, 279
commitment types and, 276–78
contracting and, 275, 276, 280
cost-distribution factors and, 286–87
embarrassment and, 280–81, 282, 288
ethical constraints and, 282–91
marathon for charity example and, 288
motivation and, 9, 275
predicting and, 275, 276–77, 280
promising and, 275–77, 278–79, 280, 282–83
reasons for implementing, 278–79
reporting and, 275, 277–78
risk imposition and, 283–91
self-announcements and, 278
self-interest and, 280
virtue signaling and, 278
Socrates, 83, 364
Solberg Nes, L., 24–25
Sripada, C., 35–37, 124–25, 130
Stapel, D., 31, 41
Steinberg, L., 345
striatum, 369–70
Stroud, S., 85–86
Svavarsdottir, S., 234–35
Swenson, P., 349, 350
“System 1” versus “System 2” cognitive processes, 89–91
Szpunar, K., 438–39
Tamir, M., 119
temptation
acceptance and, 7, 206f, 206–7, 209, 211–16, 214f, 217, 219–22
alienation and, 7, 205–6, 206f, 207–9, 211, 212–16, 214f, 218, 219, 220, 221–22
avoidance of, 8, 26, 66, 116–17, 243, 244, 245, 247–48, 251, 434–35
choice framings of, 221–22
cigarettes and, 209–15, 212–15t, 217–18, 219–20
dieting and, 209–16, 211t, 213–15t, 216f, 217, 219–20
divided mind model and, 67, 69
ego-depletion and, 248–50
fragmentation of the mind and, 243, 245–50, 251–52
Frankfurt on, 205–6
goals and, 68–69, 74, 209, 212–14, 221–22
grit and, 209, 211–12, 213t, 217–18
hypocrisy paradigm and, 251
internality and, 209, 210–14, 211–13t, 215–20, 216f, 221–22
intertemporal choice scenarios and, 434–36
locus of control and, 207, 211–12, 213t, 217–18
mental time travel and, 13, 435, 440–42, 445, 446
Mischel’s marshmallow study and, 244–45
motivational approaches to self-control and, 82
narrative capacity and, 149–50
pre-commitment strategies regarding, 441–42
religious views and, 252
repression and, 207–8
sequential choice problems and, 363
struggle framing of, 208, 221–22
trait self-control and, 243–45, 249–50
willpower and, 17, 23
yielding to, 250, 251
Tetlock, P.E., 278
Thomson, J. J., 285
Tillich, P., 296
trait self-control, 243–45, 249–50
Trost, M.R., 279
Tulving, E., 438–39, 445–46
Uhlmann, E., 184
Velleman, D., 143, 207–8
ventral premotor cortex (PMv), 106–13, 159
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 369–70
Vera-Estay, E., 346–47
(p.466) Vincent, B.T., 24
Vohs, K.D., 19–20
Vonasch, A.J., 19, 21, 22
Ward, A., 184
Watson, G., 411–12
Webb, T., 22
Wessel, J.R., 107
Wiers, R.W., 95
Wilde, O., 250
Williams, B., 180
willpower
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and, 369–70, 371
durability of, 2–3
ego-depletion and, 3, 17–18, 28
energy implied by notion of, 17, 23
free will and, 20–21, 22–23
happiness and, 27
impact of beliefs of, 97
initiative and, 21
judgment-shifts at the time of action and, 156
planning and, 22
reactive self-control and, 124
temptation and, 17, 23
Wilson, T.D., 302, 303–4, 307–8
Wolff, J., 284
Zajonc, R., 246