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Attributing KnowledgeWhat It Means to Know Something$
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Jody Azzouni

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780197508817

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197508817.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 January 2022

Confidence, Belief, and Knowledge; The Vagueness of “Know(s)”

Confidence, Belief, and Knowledge; The Vagueness of “Know(s)”

Chapter:
(p.320) 9 Confidence, Belief, and Knowledge; The Vagueness of “Know(s)”
Source:
Attributing Knowledge
Author(s):

Jody Azzouni

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0010

Knowledge does not require confidence. An agent may know without confidence because of misleading evidence or for other reasons. An agent may not believe what she knows. Misleading evidence never causes agents to lose knowledge. The vagueness of an expression may be visible to speakers or invisible. In the case of “bald,” it is visible; it is not visible for “know.” This is because knowledge standards are invisible. Vagueness is analyzed as being epistemic in the sense that our ignorance of whether a word applies in a case places no metaphysical constraints on the facts. Agential standards for evidence are also tri-scoped and application-indeterminate. There are cases where such standards determine no answer, knows or not; and there are cases where it is indeterminate whether, or not, standards determine an answer. Because Timothy Williamson’s argument against KK presupposes that knowledge requires confidence, his argument fails.

Keywords:   confidence, criterion transcendence, epistemicism, KK, knowledge retraction, knowledge standards, losing knowledge, misleading evidence, Timothy Williamson, vagueness

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