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Attributing KnowledgeWhat It Means to Know Something$
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Jody Azzouni

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780197508817

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197508817.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 January 2022

Usage Challenges to Fallibilism

Usage Challenges to Fallibilism

Chapter:
(p.343) 10 Usage Challenges to Fallibilism
Source:
Attributing Knowledge
Author(s):

Jody Azzouni

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0011

A definition of fallibility shows that agents are fallible about necessary truths. It is shown that fallibility of agents implies a denial of parity reasoning. Moorean paradoxes appear to undercut fallibility, but they are due entirely to the factivity of “know.” Kripke’s dogmatism paradox is explained: the key is recognizing that knowledge fallibility applies to the knowledge that all evidence against something one knows is misleading. That we do not know we will lose a lottery is denied. Fallibility shows this. And that people argue over this also indicates this. Knowledge closure fails because of fallibility; so does aggregation of assumptions. Vagueness shows why debates about whether we know outcomes of lotteries before winning tickets are drawn are irresolvable. Irrational penny reasoning is analyzed; it applies to nonfactive attitudes such as being really really sure. Preface paradoxes are explained. That it is sometimes rational to believe contradictory propositions is explained.

Keywords:   factivity, fallibilism, dogmatism paradox, knowledge closure, lotteries, Moorean paradoxes, parity reasoning, preface paradox, rationality, risk aggregation

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