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Attributing KnowledgeWhat It Means to Know Something$
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Jody Azzouni

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780197508817

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197508817.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 January 2022

The (Complex) Structure of the Meaning of “Know(s)”

The (Complex) Structure of the Meaning of “Know(s)”

Chapter:
(p.386) 11 The (Complex) Structure of the Meaning of “Know(s)”
Source:
Attributing Knowledge
Author(s):

Jody Azzouni

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0012

Why “know(s)” cant be defined is explained: it is not because of Gettier puzzles but because of the failure of parity reasoning. The latter shows that there is a case where S knows p and S does not know q, but where S has as much of a reason to believe p as he does to believe q. Whether “know(s)” should be retooled to have different semantic properties is explored. It is shown that the word needs to be criterion-transcendent, factive, fallible, and vague in order to be a word we can use at all, and in particular to be useful for proposition transfers between agents or between oneself at earlier times and later times, where justification is not transferred. The social roles of “know(s)” are explored next. The word has many roles that correspond to its syntactic and semantic properties.

Keywords:   classical infallibilism, conceptual engineering, criterion transcendence, epistemic consequentialism, definitions, fake-barn cases, Gettier puzzles, nowledge, social-role epistemology, Warfield cases

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