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Attributing KnowledgeWhat It Means to Know Something$
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Jody Azzouni

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780197508817

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197508817.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 January 2022

Inferential Justification

Inferential Justification

(p.245) 7 Inferential Justification
Attributing Knowledge

Jody Azzouni

Oxford University Press

The ordinary distinction between being justified and being able to give a justification is described. Being able to give a justification requires metacognition; being justified doesn’t. Animals are sometimes justified in what they believe; sometimes they’re not. A definition for justification is given by analyzing a justification j of a proposition p in terms of j providing a truth-conducive reason for p. Two forms of justification are revealed along the lines of how propositions are justified, an inferential form and a representational form. Infinitism, the suggestion that infinite chains of justifiers—both deductive and truth-enhancing—are cogent, is then explored. It’s shown both that infinitary chains of justifications can’t function as additional forms of justification and that they can’t be used as provisional justifications either.

Keywords:   Agrippa’s trilemma, coherentism, deduction, infinitism, internalism, justification regress, Pyrrhonian scepticism, semantic ascent, truth conduciveness, use and mention

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