This chapter offers an account of trust and its relation to the intellectual virtues. It argues that trust has both practical and epistemic forms, but both forms include elements of belief, feeling, and behavior. Epistemic self-trust and trust in others is prereflective and rationally inescapable. Epistemic self-trust is not an intellectual virtue, but it is closely connected to a host of such virtues. Many of the intellectual virtues would not be virtues at all were it not for the reasonableness of epistemic self-trust or trust in others. Some virtues are enhancements of epistemic trust and some are constraints on it. The connection also goes in the other direction because there are ways in which intellectual virtues prevent trust from becoming either excessive or deficient.
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