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Conditionals, Paradox, and ProbabilityThemes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington$
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Lee Walters and John Hawthorne

Print publication date: 2021

Print ISBN-13: 9780198712732

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2021

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198712732.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 27 June 2022

Counterfactuals and Probability

Counterfactuals and Probability

(p.100) 7 Counterfactuals and Probability
Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability

Robert Stalnaker

Oxford University Press

Dorothy Edgington has been a resolute defender of an NTV account of conditionals, according to which a conditional does not express a proposition that makes a categorical claim about the world, but instead make a qualified claim, or express a conditional belief, qualified by or conditional on the proposition expressed by the antecedent. Unlike some philosophers who defend an NTV view for indicative conditionals, but not for subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals, Edgington argues for the more radical thesis that both kinds of conditionals should be given a non-propositional analysis. This chapter considers Edgington’s NTV account of subjunctive conditionals, the role of objective probability in the account, and its relation to the possible-worlds propositional analysis of subjunctive conditionals.

Keywords:   subjunctive conditionals, counterfactual conditionals, possible worlds, objective probability, propositions, conditional belief

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