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Epistemic Entitlement

Peter J. Graham and Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen

Abstract

This volume collects new work on epistemic entitlement partly motivated by Tyler Burge’s and Crispin Wright’s seemingly identical distinctions between two forms of warrant: entitlement and justification. But despite nomenclature, Burge and Wright are engaged in different projects. Recognizing that we cannot provide a non-question begging evidential reply to the sceptic, Wright seeks an a priori, non-evidential, rational right to accept and claim to know cornerstone propositions. He calls these rights epistemic entitlements. Epistemic justifications are evidential warrants, contributors to know ... More

Keywords: Crispin Wright, Tyler Burge, cornerstone proposition, radical scepticism, epistemic entitlement, virtue epistemology, proper functionalism, internalism vs. externalism, warrant

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2020 Print ISBN-13: 9780198713524
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2020 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198713524.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Peter J. Graham, editor
University of California, Riverside

Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, editor
Yonsei University, Seoul

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Contents

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1 Introduction and Overview

Peter J. Graham, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, Zachary Bachman, and Luis Rosa

Part I Engaging Burge’s Project

2 Entitlement

Tyler Burge

3 Perceptual Entitlement and Skepticism

Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul

Part II Extending the Externalist Project

7 Extended Entitlement

J. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard

Part III Engaging Wright’s Project

14 Knowledge for Nothing

Patrick Greenough

End Matter