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Everything, more or less – A defence of generality relativism - Oxford Scholarship Online
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Everything, more or less: A defence of generality relativism

J. P. Studd

Abstract

Almost no systematic theorizing is generality-free. Scientists test general hypotheses; set theorists prove theorems about every set; metaphysicians espouse theses about all things regardless of their kind. But how general can we be? Do we ever succeed in theorizing about ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING in some interestingly final, all-caps-worthy sense of ‘absolutely everything’? Not according to generality relativism. In its most promising form, this kind of relativism maintains that what ‘everything’ and other quantifiers encompass is always open to expansion: no matter how broadly we may generalize, ... More

Keywords: absolute generality, quantifier, Russell’s paradox, indefinite extensibility, Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780198719649
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2019 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198719649.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

J. P. Studd, author
Associate Professor, University of Oxford