This chapter attributes to Nietzsche, and uses him to develop, a novel ‘motive-value’ model of practical normativity. The model combines both a motive-condition and a value-condition into the truth-conditions for ‘reason’ claims, thereby delivering an internalist account supplemented by an evaluative condition the content of which is given by the substantive view of value from Ch.10. The resulting model inherits various attractions of extant internalist and externalist accounts of reasons, whilst avoiding the most serious problems besetting each. Its basic structure can be accepted independently of many of the more specific Nietzschean elements going into it and may thereby be of interest to those working in these contemporary debates.
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