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Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics$
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Simon Robertson

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780198722212

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198722212.001.0001

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Metaethical Loose Ends

Metaethical Loose Ends

(p.334) 12 Metaethical Loose Ends
Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics

Simon Robertson

Oxford University Press

This final main chapter tidies up some loose ends concerning the metaethical credentials of the evaluative and normative claims going into Nietzsche’s perfectionism. Nietzsche did not have a well-worked-out metaethics; furthermore, his texts often underdetermine whatever views he might have intended. Nonetheless, the strategy is to gauge how well various positions (each with some textual support) satisfy certain basic interpretative desiderata, fit his revaluative purposes, and serve his wider philosophical needs. The chapter raises worries for a range of extant readings: realist, quasi-realist, fictionalist, and a hybrid realism/antirealism. It then attributes to Nietzsche a form of irrealism on which there are normative/evaluative truths but no metaphysically robust normative/evaluative properties.

Keywords:   antirealism, evaluative, fictionalism, irrealism, normative, quasi-realism, realism, truth

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