This and the next chapter turn to Nietzsche’s worries about the value of moral values. The present chapter focuses on objections he raises to specific moral values and features: Mitleid, equality, and blame/guilt. However, it argues, although his objections may be psychologically astute, as arguments against morality they are unconvincing. Nevertheless, there is a deeper concern underlying his objections, which gives rise to a different and more promising line of criticism, explored in Ch.6. The present chapter also includes an excursus on the value of pain and suffering, introducing two ideas we return to at various points: that pain/suffering can be constitutively (not just instrumentally) valuable; and that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are not entirely separable.
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