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Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics$
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Simon Robertson

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780198722212

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198722212.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 18 September 2021

Morality’s Disvalue

Morality’s Disvalue

Morality vs. Excellence

Chapter:
(p.132) 6 Morality’s Disvalue
Source:
Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics
Author(s):

Simon Robertson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198722212.003.0006

The central objection animating Nietzsche’s critique is that morality impedes the highest human excellences and hence value. The objection shares certain affinities with worries levied by more recent morality critics, who argue that moral theories are unable to accommodate the legitimate pursuit of various non-moral goods crucial to a minimally good life. One common response on behalf of morality is to defend a less demanding moral theory that does accommodate relevant non-moral goods. This chapter reconstructs Nietzsche’s objection via two arguments, showing that his version has bite even against undemanding moral theories: such theories would still impede the highest excellences. It then examines how the objection can be extended: how morality impedes not just the highest excellences but our lesser flourishing too.

Keywords:   excellence, higher types, internalize, morality, moral values, undemanding moral theory

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