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Morality and the Nature of Law$
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Kenneth Einar Himma

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198723479

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198723479.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 July 2021

Legal Positivism and the Possibility of Moral Criteria of Validity

Legal Positivism and the Possibility of Moral Criteria of Validity

Chapter:
(p.61) 3 Legal Positivism and the Possibility of Moral Criteria of Validity
Source:
Morality and the Nature of Law
Author(s):

Kenneth Einar Himma

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198723479.003.0004

This chapter provides an overview of the theses associated with the various forms of legal positivism. It begins with a discussion of the assumption that legal norms and systems have certain properties that distinguish them from other norms and systems that purport to govern or regulate the behavior of subjects. The chapter continues with a description of the core theses of legal positivism. These theses are intended to identify the conceptually necessary properties that constitute something as law and distinguish things that count as law from things that do not count as law. Finally, this chapter closes with an explication of inclusive and exclusive positivism.

Keywords:   legal positivism, legal validity, moral criteria, legal norms and systems, inclusive positivism, exclusive positivism

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