Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Morality and the Nature of Law$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Kenneth Einar Himma

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198723479

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198723479.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 July 2021

Inclusive Positivism and the Arguments from Authority

Inclusive Positivism and the Arguments from Authority

Chapter:
(p.89) 4 Inclusive Positivism and the Arguments from Authority
Source:
Morality and the Nature of Law
Author(s):

Kenneth Einar Himma

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198723479.003.0005

This chapter explores the various tensions that might be thought to arise between the Incorporation Thesis and practical authority. The Incorporation Thesis states that there is a conceptually possible legal system with moral criteria of validity. In such a legal system, the properties that constitute a norm as legally valid include properties having to do with whether its content satisfies certain moral standards. This chapter begins with a general discussion of the differences between practical and epistemic authority. The chapter then articulates the various theses associated with the so-called service conception of authority and concludes with a summary of the arguments for the claim that this conception of authority is inconsistent with the Incorporation Thesis.

Keywords:   Incorporation Thesis, practical authority, legal validity, epistemic authority, service conception of authority

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .