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Kant and the Philosophy of MindPerception, Reason, and the Self$
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Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198724957

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198724957.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 January 2022

Judging for Reasons

Judging for Reasons

On Kant and the Modalities of Judgment

(p.173) 10 Judging for Reasons
Kant and the Philosophy of Mind

Jessica Leech

Oxford University Press

What, if any, is the relation between modal judgment and our capacity to make judgments at all? On a plausible interpretation, Kant connects what he calls the modality of a judgment to its location in a course of reasoning: actual inferential relations between that act of judgment and others. However, there is a puzzling consequence of this interpretation. It is natural to understand Kant as claiming that every judgment has some modality, but if the modality of a judgment is its location in a course of reasoning, then the implication is that every judgment must occur as part of a course of reasoning. Why think this? This chapter proposes an answer that draws on the relationship between judgment, judging for reasons, and the unity of consciousness.

Keywords:   Kant, concept, judgment, modality, reasoning, unity of consciousness

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