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Kant and the Philosophy of MindPerception, Reason, and the Self$
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Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198724957

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198724957.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 30 November 2021

Intuition and Presence

Intuition and Presence

(p.86) 5 Intuition and Presence
Kant and the Philosophy of Mind

Colin McLear

Oxford University Press

This chapter explicates the notion of ‘presence’ (Gegenwart) as it pertains to intuition. Specifically, it examines two central problems for the position that an empirical intuition is an immediate relation to an existing particular in one’s environment. The first stems from Kant’s description of the faculty of imagination, while the second stems from Kant’s discussion of hallucination. This chapter argues that Kant’s writings indicate at least one possible means of reconciling these two problems with a conception of ‘presence’ such that perceptual and hallucinatory states might be understood as different kinds of intuition. This may not be sufficient to secure the relationalist’s claim that intuition is an immediate relation to an existing particular in one’s environment, but it does show that opposition to this claim will require further argument.

Keywords:   hallucination, imagination, intuition, Kant, perception

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