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The Science of MeaningEssays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics$
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Derek Ball and Brian Rabern

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198739548

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198739548.001.0001

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Lexical Meaning, Concepts, and the Metasemantics of Predicates

Lexical Meaning, Concepts, and the Metasemantics of Predicates

(p.197) 7 Lexical Meaning, Concepts, and the Metasemantics of Predicates
The Science of Meaning

Michael Glanzberg

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines how concepts relate to lexical meanings. It focuses on how we can appeal to concepts to give specific, cognitively rich contents to lexical entries, while at the same time using standard methods of compositional semantics. This is a problem, as those methods assume lexical meanings provide extensions, while concepts are mental representations that have very different structure from an extension. The chapter proposes a way to solve this problem which is by casting concepts in a metasemantic role for certain expressions, notably verbs, but more also generally, with expressions that function as content-giving predicates in a sentence.

Keywords:   concepts, lexicon, meaning, composition, metasemantics

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