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Singular Thought and Mental Files$
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Rachel Goodman, James Genone, and Nick Kroll

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780198746881

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198746881.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 01 March 2021

Varieties of Singularity

Varieties of Singularity

(p.21) 2 Varieties of Singularity
Singular Thought and Mental Files

Mark Sainsbury

Oxford University Press

What is it for a thought to be singular? The chapter argues that there is no single answer. Singularity in thought is associated with a variety of non-equivalent features. For example, some argue that the object of a singular thought should be something with which we are acquainted, or should involve the exercise of a mental file; or the thought should essentially “involve” its object, or refer to it rigidly. The chapter claims that the main task should be to examine the relations between these various features; there is little interest in trying to determine what a “real” singular thought is.

Keywords:   singularity, acquaintance, rigidity, object-involving, descriptive name, mental files

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