De Jure Anti-Coreference and Mental Files
De Jure Anti-Coreference and Mental Files
The chapter introduces the phenomenon of de jure anti-coreference. Roughly, two representation occurrences are de jure anti-coreferential when they must refer to distinct objects in virtue of meaning. It argues that in contrast to its opposing notion, de jure coreference, it is rarely found in human representational systems. It explains how the Fregean can hope to explain this asymmetry by appealing to senses or mental files. It argues, however, that such approaches, in order to account for dynamic coordination, must ultimately appeal to semantic relationism. This is surprising since semantic relationism is often thought of as an alternative to Fregean semantics.
Keywords: semantic relationism, de jure coreference, senses, Frege, mental files
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