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Knowing by Perceiving$
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Alan Millar

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198755692

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198755692.001.0001

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Perception and the Justification of Belief

Perception and the Justification of Belief

(p.97) 5 Perception and the Justification of Belief
Knowing by Perceiving

Alan Millar

Oxford University Press

The discussion in this chapter is critical of theories that treat experiences, conceived in a non-relationalistic fashion, as evidence for beliefs, as in the work of Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. It is also critical of James Pryor’s theory of immediate justification. Judgements implicated in recognition, being exercises of general recognitional abilities, are regarded as rationally responsive to ways the world is. Justification for beliefs acquired in acts of recognition is provided by truths as to what one perceives to be so. An account is given of our access to such truths, and objections to the view of justification are addressed. Affinities with, and differences from, views advanced by John McDowell are explored, with particular attention given to his conceptions of experience. Implications for empiricism are drawn out.

Keywords:   Earl Conee, empiricism, evidence, experience, James Pryor, John McDowell, justification for beliefs, recognition, recognitional abilities, Richard Feldman

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