Perceptual knowledge is viewed as a paradigm of knowledge in virtue of so clearly exemplifying cognitive contact with a fact in an act—recognition—in which reason reaches out to the fact itself. This outlook is contrasted with that on which the work of reason is confined to forming a belief that might or might not be true in a manner that reliably but not infallibly yields true beliefs. The latter outlook is implicit in strands of virtue epistemology, notably in work of Greco and Sosa. It is argued that we should not attempt to explicate recognitional abilities in terms of more basic abilities that bear directly on the justification of belief or in terms of more basic belief-forming dispositions. Some complexities concerning the individuation of recognitional abilities are explored.
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