Knowledge from Perceived Indicators and Background Knowledge
Knowledge from Perceived Indicators and Background Knowledge
The focus is on knowing that something is so by perceiving something that indicates that it is so. It is argued that some of our knowledge of this sort is more akin to perceptual knowledge than might at first appear. This is because recognition figures in two ways. We recognize the indicating phenomenon as being of a certain sort and we recognize the indicative significance of the indicator. The view is shown to be compatible with taking the knowledge in question to be evidence-based. An alternative model—the covering generalization model—is critically discussed. Since generalizations do figure in our thinking about indicators, their status is discussed. This leads into a more general discussion of standing factual knowledge that touches on public knowledge and picks up themes from Moore and Wittgenstein.
Keywords: evidence-based knowledge, G. E. Moore, generalizations, indicators, indicative significance, public knowledge, recognition, standing factual knowledge, Wittgenstein
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