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Knowing by Perceiving$
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Alan Millar

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198755692

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198755692.001.0001

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Going By What We Know

Going By What We Know

Chapter:
(p.188) 9 Going By What We Know
Source:
Knowing by Perceiving
Author(s):

Alan Millar

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0009

We have knowledge and often know that we have it. It is argued that epistemology should be guided by what we know about knowledge and not simply by so-called intuitions. This theme is worked out within a broader discussion of method in epistemology. Considerations motivating resistance to such a view are discussed, including the Russellian Retreat mentioned by Crispin Wright and the quest to understand human knowledge in general discussed by Barry Stroud. Sources of puzzlement about how we can have knowledge of our environment are identified. A positive lesson—the limits to self-understanding—is drawn from Stroud. Arguments from Ignorance (by Sceptical Hypotheses) in support of scepticism are critically discussed. It is suggested that the right response to scepticism is to show what is mistaken about the theories that underpin it.

Keywords:   Arguments from Ignorance (by Sceptical Hypotheses), Barry Stroud, Crispin Wright, epistemology, intuition, method, Russellian Retreat, scepticism, self-understanding

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