Going By What We Know
Going By What We Know
We have knowledge and often know that we have it. It is argued that epistemology should be guided by what we know about knowledge and not simply by so-called intuitions. This theme is worked out within a broader discussion of method in epistemology. Considerations motivating resistance to such a view are discussed, including the Russellian Retreat mentioned by Crispin Wright and the quest to understand human knowledge in general discussed by Barry Stroud. Sources of puzzlement about how we can have knowledge of our environment are identified. A positive lesson—the limits to self-understanding—is drawn from Stroud. Arguments from Ignorance (by Sceptical Hypotheses) in support of scepticism are critically discussed. It is suggested that the right response to scepticism is to show what is mistaken about the theories that underpin it.
Keywords: Arguments from Ignorance (by Sceptical Hypotheses), Barry Stroud, Crispin Wright, epistemology, intuition, method, Russellian Retreat, scepticism, self-understanding
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