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Attention, Not Self$
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Jonardon Ganeri

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198757405

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198757405.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 01 August 2021

Self and Other

Self and Other

(p.314) 15 Self and Other
Attention, Not Self

Jonardon Ganeri

Oxford University Press

Experiences like shame presuppose that there is a distinction between self and other, for shame is an empathetic access to another’s attention on one, and a resultant diminishing of self-esteem. There is no need to introduce any more robust distinction between self and other than the one implied by a conception of persons as beings with a characteristic capacity for attention. In particular, there is no need to conceive of the distinction as having its basis in a phenomenology of interiority or in an authorial conception of self. The conception of human beings as endowed with the capacity for attention provides an alternative both to strident individualism and to impersonal holism.

Keywords:   philosophy of mind, Buddhist philosophy, individualism, impersonalism, shame, conscience, experiential self

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