Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Attention, Not Self$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jonardon Ganeri

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198757405

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198757405.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 October 2021

The Content of Perceptual Experience

The Content of Perceptual Experience

(p.85) 4 The Content of Perceptual Experience
Attention, Not Self

Jonardon Ganeri

Oxford University Press

Attention performs two constitutive roles in perceptual experience. This chapter argues that this claim is motivated by a need to respect two apparently competing insights about experience, one having to do with its epistemic role in supplying reasons for our beliefs about the world around us, the other to do with the phenomenology of openness to the world. Attention is the glue that binds our sensate, active, and rational natures, that in virtue of which we both find ourselves absorbed by a world of solicitations and also what enables us to access objective features of the entities whose presence solicits us.

Keywords:   Buddhist philosophy, philosophy of mind, cognitive access, phenomenal quality, perceptual experience, linguistic capability

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .