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Brute Facts$
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Elly Vintiadis and Constantinos Mekios

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198758600

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198758600.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 31 July 2021

There is Nothing (Really) Wrong with Emergent Brute Facts

There is Nothing (Really) Wrong with Emergent Brute Facts

Chapter:
(p.197) 11 There is Nothing (Really) Wrong with Emergent Brute Facts
Source:
Brute Facts
Author(s):

Elly Vintiadis

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198758600.003.0011

The purpose of this chapter is to offer a defense of the emergentist view concerning emergent brute facts. To this end, it reviews and evaluates the three main objections raised against the possibility of emergent brute facts: the simplicity argument, the question of whether the idea of emergent brute facts is a coherent idea, and the question of empirical evidence. This chapter contends that none of these arguments is successful in refuting the possibility or the plausibility of the existence of emergent brute facts. It also argues that, in the end, the question revolves around empirical evidence, and that empirical considerations favor the existence of emergent brute facts.

Keywords:   emergence, reduction, explanation, supervenience, brute facts

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