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Normativity – Epistemic and Practical - Oxford Scholarship Online
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Normativity: Epistemic and Practical

Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting

Abstract

What should I do? What should I think? Traditionally, ethicists tackle the first question, while epistemologists tackle the second. This division of labour corresponds to a distinction theorists draw between practical and epistemic normativity, where normativity is a matter of what one should or may do or think, what one has reason or justification to do or to think, what it is right or wrong to do or to think, and so on. Philosophers have tended to investigate the issue of what to do independently of the issue of what to think, that is, to do ethics independently of epistemology, and vice ver ... More

Keywords: normativity, epistemic, practical, belief, action, reasons, ought, justification

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780198758709
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Conor McHugh, editor
University of Southampton

Jonathan Way, editor
University of Southampton

Daniel Whiting, editor
University of Southampton