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NormativityEpistemic and Practical$
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Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198758709

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001

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Putting Fallibilism to Work

Putting Fallibilism to Work

Chapter:
(p.12) 1 Putting Fallibilism to Work
Source:
Normativity
Author(s):

Charity Anderson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0002

The principle that when one knows p, one is in a good enough epistemic position to treat p as a reason for action is used to motivate pragmatic encroachment. When combined with fallibilism, this principle (Sufficiency) results in the rejection of purism, the view that pragmatic factors are irrelevant to knowledge. Fallibilism, purism, and Sufficiency each have substantial prima facie intuitive support; and yet the three seem to form an inconsistent triad. The author of this chapter challenges the account of reasons that underlies one prominent way of arguing for Sufficiency and then she delineates a position that manages to avoid the trilemma.

Keywords:   fallibilism, invariantism, knowledge, pragmatic encroachment, purism

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