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NormativityEpistemic and Practical$
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Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198758709

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 26 September 2021

Directives for Knowledge and Belief

Directives for Knowledge and Belief

Chapter:
(p.68) 4 Directives for Knowledge and Belief
Source:
Normativity
Author(s):

David Hunter

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0005

To understand belief directives it is helpful to start with knowledge directives, for they can be unspecific in an important way, are not as puzzling from a first-person point of view, and are viewed by common sense as more fundamental. A person’s duties, personal obligations, and rights are, common sense holds, relevant but not decisive to what they ought to know, and so to what they ought to believe. It further holds that people ought in general to know what they ought to do and even, to some extent, what they are doing. And it allows that a person may be required to know something for which they have no evidence. All of this poses difficulties for the philosophical view that facts about a person’s evidence are relevant to what they ought to believe.

Keywords:   belief, knowledge, evidentialism, ought, normativity

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