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NormativityEpistemic and Practical$
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Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198758709

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001

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How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence

How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence

(p.90) 5 How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence

Benjamin Kiesewetter

Oxford University Press

This chapter develops a theory of how claims about an agent’s normative reasons are sensitive to the epistemic circumstances of this agent, which preserves the plausible ideas that reasons are facts and that reasons can be discovered in deliberation and disclosed in advice. It argues that a plausible theory of this kind must take into account the difference between synchronic and diachronic reasons, i.e. reasons for acting immediately and reasons for acting at some later point in time. The chapter provides a general account of the relation between synchronic and diachronic reasons, demonstrates its implications for the evidence-sensitivity of reasons, and finally presents and defends an argument for the theory that has been developed.

Keywords:   reasons, ought, deliberation, synchronic reasons, diachronic reasons, perspective-dependence

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