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NormativityEpistemic and Practical$
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Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198758709

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 21 September 2021

The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason

The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason

Chapter:
(p.137) 7 The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason
Source:
Normativity
Author(s):

Errol Lord

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0008

Cognitivists about practical reason hold that we can explain why certain wide-scope requirements of practical rationality are true by appealing to certain epistemic requirements. Extant discussions of cognitivism focus solely on two claims. The first is the claim that intentions involve beliefs. The second is that whenever your intentions are incoherent in certain ways, you will be epistemically irrational (given that intentions involve beliefs). Even if the cognitivist successfully defends these claims, she still has to show that the epistemic requirements explain the practical requirements. This chapter argues that it is not plausible that the epistemic requirements explain the practical requirements. This shows that the cognitivists’ project will fail even if their controversial views about the relationship between the practical and epistemic are granted.

Keywords:   cognitivism about practical reason, wide-scope requirements, inheritance principle, cognitivism, practical and epistemic

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