Fundamentals of Human Rights Theory
Fundamentals of Human Rights Theory
The previous three chapters described three central problems that recur when courts have to deal with religious litigation: the teleological problem, epistemological problem, and ontological problem. All three problems are both the occasion for disputes, and (taken together) exacerbate other disputes, bringing the courts themselves into the fray, preventing them from playing the role of standing above the conflict. So, what is to be done? This chapter proposes a reconstructed practice-dependent theory of human rights that addresses issues of religion. It discusses how human dignity provides a normative foundation for the system of human rights as a whole. The proposed theory accepts that human rights law and human rights practice beyond the legal sphere is pluralistic, and that building this pluralism into human rights theory accurately reflects the diverse nature of human rights, including judicial adjudication and religious narratives within that system.
Keywords: religious litigation, religion, human rights, human dignity, pluralism
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