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A Theory of International Organization$
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Liesbet Hooghe, Tobias Lenz, and Gary Marks

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198766988

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198766988.001.0001

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Why States Pool Authority

Why States Pool Authority

Chapter:
(p.104) 7 Why States Pool Authority
Source:
A Theory of International Organization
Author(s):

Liesbet Hooghe

Tobias Lenz

Gary Marks

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198766988.003.0007

Why do states sacrifice the national veto in international organizations? A large membership IO can exploit economies of scale and allow states to cooperate over problems that would otherwise confront them individually. However, cooperation among a large number of states brings the danger of decisional blockage. The most plausible explanation for why member states pool authority in international organizations appears to be the simplest: they do so in response to the number of potential veto players in the organization. This argument is assessed in a cross-sectional analysis for seventy-six international organizations using a measure of pooling that distinguishes the mode, bindingness, and substantive area of decision making.

Keywords:   IO, international organization, pooling, IO policy, membership, unanimity, majoritarian decision making

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