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Extended Epistemology$
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J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198769811

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198769811.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 04 July 2022

Extended Cognition, Trust and Glue, and Knowledge

Extended Cognition, Trust and Glue, and Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.64) 3 Extended Cognition, Trust and Glue, and Knowledge
Source:
Extended Epistemology
Author(s):

Kenneth Aizawa

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0004

This chapter has two goals: one clarificatory and the other cautionary. The first clarificatory point is to draw attention to the way in which Clark’s conditions of trust and glue have figured into some of the arguments epistemologists have given for the implications of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). The second cautionary point is to provide some new reasons for thinking that the conditions of trust and glue do not provide a plausible account of when cognitive processes extend. Also addressed are externalism, the philosophy of mind, and the work of such thinkers as Palermos, Carter, Kallestrup, and Pritchard.

Keywords:   epistemology, philosophy of mind, extended cognition hypothesis, HEC, externalism, trust and glue, Palermos, Carter, Kallestrup, Pritchard

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