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On What MattersVolume Three$
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Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198778608

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.001.0001

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Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements

Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements

Chapter:
(p.182) 46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
Source:
On What Matters
Author(s):

Derek Parfit

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198778608.003.0011

This chapter investigates a wider, non-realist cognitivist form. In this view, our normative concepts and claims cannot be defined or restated in naturalistic terms. As non-naturalists believe, these concepts and claims are irreducibly normative. According to metaphysical non-naturalists, these claims imply that there exist some ontologically weighty non-natural entities or properties. But if non-naturalists gave up their ontological beliefs in these mysterious non-natural properties, the best version of non-naturalism would coincide with the best version of the quasi-realist expressivism discussed in this chapter. Some non-naturalists, however, do not have such ontological beliefs, as there are some non-empirical truths which have no weighty ontological implications.

Keywords:   non-realist cognitivism, non-naturalism, ontological beliefs, non-natural properties, quasi-realist expressivism

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