- Title Pages
- Dedication
- On What Matters
- Preface
- Summary
-
37 How Things Might Matter -
38 Non-Realist Cognitivism -
39 Normative and Natural Truths -
40 Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists -
41 Railton’s Defence of Soft Naturalism -
42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
43 Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths -
44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis -
45 Quasi-Realist Expressivism -
46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
47 Another Triple Theory -
48 Expressivist Reasons -
49 Subjectivist Reasons -
50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism -
51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons -
52 Nietzsche’s Mountain -
53 What Matters and Universal Reasons -
54 Conflicting Reasons -
55 The Right and the Good -
56 Deontological Principles -
57 Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality -
58 Towards a Unified Theory - Notes
- References
- Bibliography
- Index
Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
- Chapter:
- (p.182) 46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
- Source:
- On What Matters
- Author(s):
Derek Parfit
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter investigates a wider, non-realist cognitivist form. In this view, our normative concepts and claims cannot be defined or restated in naturalistic terms. As non-naturalists believe, these concepts and claims are irreducibly normative. According to metaphysical non-naturalists, these claims imply that there exist some ontologically weighty non-natural entities or properties. But if non-naturalists gave up their ontological beliefs in these mysterious non-natural properties, the best version of non-naturalism would coincide with the best version of the quasi-realist expressivism discussed in this chapter. Some non-naturalists, however, do not have such ontological beliefs, as there are some non-empirical truths which have no weighty ontological implications.
Keywords: non-realist cognitivism, non-naturalism, ontological beliefs, non-natural properties, quasi-realist expressivism
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- On What Matters
- Preface
- Summary
-
37 How Things Might Matter -
38 Non-Realist Cognitivism -
39 Normative and Natural Truths -
40 Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists -
41 Railton’s Defence of Soft Naturalism -
42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
43 Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths -
44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis -
45 Quasi-Realist Expressivism -
46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
47 Another Triple Theory -
48 Expressivist Reasons -
49 Subjectivist Reasons -
50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism -
51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons -
52 Nietzsche’s Mountain -
53 What Matters and Universal Reasons -
54 Conflicting Reasons -
55 The Right and the Good -
56 Deontological Principles -
57 Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality -
58 Towards a Unified Theory - Notes
- References
- Bibliography
- Index
