- Title Pages
- Dedication
- On What Matters
- Preface
- Summary
-
37 How Things Might Matter -
38 Non-Realist Cognitivism -
39 Normative and Natural Truths -
40 Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists -
41 Railton’s Defence of Soft Naturalism -
42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
43 Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths -
44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis -
45 Quasi-Realist Expressivism -
46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
47 Another Triple Theory -
48 Expressivist Reasons -
49 Subjectivist Reasons -
50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism -
51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons -
52 Nietzsche’s Mountain -
53 What Matters and Universal Reasons -
54 Conflicting Reasons -
55 The Right and the Good -
56 Deontological Principles -
57 Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality -
58 Towards a Unified Theory - Notes
- References
- Bibliography
- Index
Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism
Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism
- Chapter:
- (p.264) 50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism
- Source:
- On What Matters
- Author(s):
Derek Parfit
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter considers an evolutionary debunking argument, which states that, because our normative beliefs were greatly influenced by natural selection, these beliefs were caused in ways that were unrelated to their truth. When we know that our beliefs were caused in such ways, these beliefs cannot be justified. The chapter rejects that argument. Though our normative beliefs were influenced by natural selection, this influence was not great enough to give strong support to the evolutionary debunking argument. Furthermore, the chapter questions the suggestions that the causal origins of our normative beliefs could not epistemically undermine these beliefs, and that, in responding to the skeptic's argument from disagreement, we can deny that it makes a difference whether, in ideal conditions, we would in fact have similar normative beliefs.
Keywords: meta-ethical constructivism, evolutionary debunking argument, natural selection, normative beliefs, relativism
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
- Title Pages
- Dedication
- On What Matters
- Preface
- Summary
-
37 How Things Might Matter -
38 Non-Realist Cognitivism -
39 Normative and Natural Truths -
40 Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists -
41 Railton’s Defence of Soft Naturalism -
42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
43 Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths -
44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis -
45 Quasi-Realist Expressivism -
46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
47 Another Triple Theory -
48 Expressivist Reasons -
49 Subjectivist Reasons -
50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism -
51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons -
52 Nietzsche’s Mountain -
53 What Matters and Universal Reasons -
54 Conflicting Reasons -
55 The Right and the Good -
56 Deontological Principles -
57 Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality -
58 Towards a Unified Theory - Notes
- References
- Bibliography
- Index
