- Title Pages
- Dedication
- On What Matters
- Preface
- Summary
-
37 How Things Might Matter -
38 Non-Realist Cognitivism -
39 Normative and Natural Truths -
40 Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists -
41 Railton’s Defence of Soft Naturalism -
42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
43 Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths -
44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis -
45 Quasi-Realist Expressivism -
46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
47 Another Triple Theory -
48 Expressivist Reasons -
49 Subjectivist Reasons -
50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism -
51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons -
52 Nietzsche’s Mountain -
53 What Matters and Universal Reasons -
54 Conflicting Reasons -
55 The Right and the Good -
56 Deontological Principles -
57 Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality -
58 Towards a Unified Theory - Notes
- References
- Bibliography
- Index
Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons
Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons
- Chapter:
- (p.291) 51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons
- Source:
- On What Matters
- Author(s):
Derek Parfit
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter presents two claims. The first is that no fact could give us a reason if we could not possibly be aware of this fact, or our awareness of this fact could not possibly motivate us. Next is that the moral wrongness of an act cannot give us a reason if we could not possibly believe that such acts are wrong. To both these claims, the chapter maintains an externalist view in accepting these claims. However, it also rejects the claim that an act's wrongness cannot give us a reason unless our belief that this act is wrong would actually motivate us. With several more claims regarding moral accountability and blameworthiness, this chapter makes further arguments concerning the true beliefs about reasons that are considered either externalist or objectivist.
Keywords: morality, moral accountability, blame, blameworthiness, internal reasons, moral wrongness, reason
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
- Title Pages
- Dedication
- On What Matters
- Preface
- Summary
-
37 How Things Might Matter -
38 Non-Realist Cognitivism -
39 Normative and Natural Truths -
40 Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists -
41 Railton’s Defence of Soft Naturalism -
42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
43 Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths -
44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis -
45 Quasi-Realist Expressivism -
46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements -
47 Another Triple Theory -
48 Expressivist Reasons -
49 Subjectivist Reasons -
50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism -
51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons -
52 Nietzsche’s Mountain -
53 What Matters and Universal Reasons -
54 Conflicting Reasons -
55 The Right and the Good -
56 Deontological Principles -
57 Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality -
58 Towards a Unified Theory - Notes
- References
- Bibliography
- Index
