- Title Pages
- Dedication
- On What Matters
- Preface
- Summary
- 37 How Things Might Matter
- 38 Non-Realist Cognitivism
- 39 Normative and Natural Truths
- 40 Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists
- 41 Railton’s Defence of Soft Naturalism
- 42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
- 43 Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths
- 44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis
- 45 Quasi-Realist Expressivism
- 46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
- 47 Another Triple Theory
- 48 Expressivist Reasons
- 49 Subjectivist Reasons
- 50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism
- 51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons
- 52 Nietzsche’s Mountain
- 53 What Matters and Universal Reasons
- 54 Conflicting Reasons
- 55 The Right and the Good
- 56 Deontological Principles
- 57 Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality
- 58 Towards a Unified Theory
- Notes
- References
- Bibliography
- Index
Deontological Principles
Deontological Principles
- Chapter:
- (p.369) 56 Deontological Principles
- Source:
- On What Matters
- Author(s):
Derek Parfit
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter considers the harm principle. According to this principle, our negative duties not to harm people are much stronger than our positive duties to make things go better by saving people from being harmed. One of two duties would be stronger in the cost-requiring sense if we would be morally required to bear greater burdens, if that were necessary, to fulfil this duty. One of two duties would be stronger in the conflict-of-duty sense if this duty would be stronger than the other when these duties conflict. Our negative duties not to harm people may be much stronger in the cost-requiring sense than our positive duties to save people from being harmed. But these negative duties are not, this chapter argues, much stronger in the conflict-of-duty sense.
Keywords: harm principle, means principle, negative duties, conflict of duties, positive duties, harm
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
- Title Pages
- Dedication
- On What Matters
- Preface
- Summary
- 37 How Things Might Matter
- 38 Non-Realist Cognitivism
- 39 Normative and Natural Truths
- 40 Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists
- 41 Railton’s Defence of Soft Naturalism
- 42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
- 43 Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths
- 44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis
- 45 Quasi-Realist Expressivism
- 46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
- 47 Another Triple Theory
- 48 Expressivist Reasons
- 49 Subjectivist Reasons
- 50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism
- 51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons
- 52 Nietzsche’s Mountain
- 53 What Matters and Universal Reasons
- 54 Conflicting Reasons
- 55 The Right and the Good
- 56 Deontological Principles
- 57 Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality
- 58 Towards a Unified Theory
- Notes
- References
- Bibliography
- Index
