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On What MattersVolume Three$
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Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198778608

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 October 2021

Non-Realist Cognitivism

Non-Realist Cognitivism

(p.55) 38 Non-Realist Cognitivism
On What Matters

Derek Parfit

Oxford University Press

This chapter looks at how we can roughly distinguish several views that are meta-ethical in the sense that they are about the meaning and truth of moral claims, and of other normative claims. It looks at how non-naturalist views can differ ontologically by making different claims about what exists and what is real. Going further, the metaphysical non-naturalists believe that, when we make irreducibly normative claims, these claims imply that there exist some ontologically weighty non-natural entities or properties. non-metaphysical non-naturalists make no such claims, since they deny that irreducibly normative truths have any such ontologically weighty implications. One such view in this light is non-realist cognitivism, in which there are some true claims which are not made to be true by the way in which they correctly describe, or correspond to, how things are in some part of reality.

Keywords:   non-realist cognitivism, ontology, meta-ethics, moral claims, normative claims, truths, reality

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