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On What MattersVolume Three$
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Derek Parfit

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198778608

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198778608.001.0001

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Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements

Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements

(p.99) 42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
On What Matters

Derek Parfit

Oxford University Press

This chapter resolves the disagreements which arose in the previous chapter. Metaphysical naturalists believe that there are no ontologically weighty non-natural normative properties and truths. But naturalists can believe that there are some non-ontological normative properties and truths. Some examples are truths about which acts are wrong, and about which facts give us normative reasons. We could justifiably believe that there are such normative truths, since this belief would not add anything mysterious to our ontology. These claims have led to the belief that there are some normative truths of a different kind that have yet to be considered. Furthermore, this wider view avoids or answers all of the previous chapters' objections to Normative Naturalism, such as the normativity and triviality objections, and what is called the soft naturalist's dilemma.

Keywords:   naturalism, non-ontological normative properties and truths, normative truths, normative naturalism, normativity, triviality objections, soft naturalist's dilemma

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