- Title Pages
- Dedication
- On What Matters
- Preface
- Summary
- 37 How Things Might Matter
- 38 Non-Realist Cognitivism
- 39 Normative and Natural Truths
- 40 Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists
- 41 Railton’s Defence of Soft Naturalism
- 42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
- 43 Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths
- 44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis
- 45 Quasi-Realist Expressivism
- 46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
- 47 Another Triple Theory
- 48 Expressivist Reasons
- 49 Subjectivist Reasons
- 50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism
- 51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons
- 52 Nietzsche’s Mountain
- 53 What Matters and Universal Reasons
- 54 Conflicting Reasons
- 55 The Right and the Good
- 56 Deontological Principles
- 57 Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality
- 58 Towards a Unified Theory
- Notes
- References
- Bibliography
- Index
Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis
Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis
- Chapter:
- (p.137) 44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis
- Source:
- On What Matters
- Author(s):
Derek Parfit
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
This chapter establishes criticisms of the triviality objection. It clears up some misinterpretations regarding the objection and considers how this argument might apply to a reductive thesis about normative reasons. These arguments do not imply that we cannot have true irreducibly normative beliefs. The chapter also offers a defence of the view that some things matter, in the sense that we have reasons to care about some things. This view, however, would be hard to defend if, as is sometimes claimed, all of our reasons were given by facts that are in part about our present desires. The fact that we have certain desires could not give us reasons to have them. Finally, this chapter clarifies another misconception regarding the triviality of conceptual truths.
Keywords: conservative reductive thesis, triviality objection, conceptual truths, misconceptions, misinterpretations
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- On What Matters
- Preface
- Summary
- 37 How Things Might Matter
- 38 Non-Realist Cognitivism
- 39 Normative and Natural Truths
- 40 Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists
- 41 Railton’s Defence of Soft Naturalism
- 42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
- 43 Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths
- 44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis
- 45 Quasi-Realist Expressivism
- 46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
- 47 Another Triple Theory
- 48 Expressivist Reasons
- 49 Subjectivist Reasons
- 50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism
- 51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons
- 52 Nietzsche’s Mountain
- 53 What Matters and Universal Reasons
- 54 Conflicting Reasons
- 55 The Right and the Good
- 56 Deontological Principles
- 57 Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality
- 58 Towards a Unified Theory
- Notes
- References
- Bibliography
- Index
