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Minimal MoralityA Multilevel Social Contract Theory$
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Michael Moehler

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198785927

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198785927.001.0001

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Introduction

Introduction

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Introduction
Source:
Minimal Morality
Author(s):

Michael Moehler

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198785927.003.0001

In this chapter the author discusses the core concepts that underlie the two-level contractarian theory developed in this book, in particular the concepts of deep moral pluralism, traditional morality, and pure instrumental morality. Further, the chapter provides a brief synopsis of the main argument presented in this book and clarifies its theoretical and practical relevance. Finally, the chapter addresses some of the methodological considerations, such as the debate concerning ideal and nonideal theory, the application of rational choice theory to moral philosophy, and the scope of social morality, that are essential for understanding the nature and architecture of the two-level contractarian theory.

Keywords:   deep moral pluralism, traditional morality, pure instrumental morality, ideal and nonideal theory, rational choice theory, social morality

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