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Philosophy and Model Theory$
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Tim Button and Sean Walsh

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198790396

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198790396.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 28 October 2021

Internal categoricity and truth

Internal categoricity and truth

(p.271) 12 Internal categoricity and truth
Philosophy and Model Theory

Tim Button

Sean Walsh

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers whether internal categoricity can be used to leverage any claims about mathematical truth. We begin by noting that internal categoricity allows us to introduce a truth-operator which gives an object-language expression to the supervaluationist semantics. In this way, the univocity discussed in previous chapters might seem to secure an object-language expression of determinacy of truth-value; but this hope falls short, because such truth-operators must be carefully distinguished from truth-predicates. To introduce these truth-predicates, we outline an internalist attitude towards model theory itself. We then use this to illuminate the cryptic conclusions of Putnam's justly-famous paper ‘Models and Reality’. We close this chapter by presenting Tarski’s famous result that truth for lower-order languages can be defined in higher-order languages.

Keywords:   Internalism and Supervaluationism, truth operator vs. truth predicate, Putnam’s Internal Realism, truth and higher-order logic, Tarski’s Theorem

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