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Enactivist InterventionsRethinking the Mind$
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Shaun Gallagher

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198794325

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198794325.001.0001

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(p.1) 1 Introduction
Enactivist Interventions

Shaun Gallagher

Oxford University Press

This chapter introduces some of the questions and issues that are explored in more depth in later chapters. It starts with a brief review of some internalist conceptions of cognition and then specifies, in contrast, the assumptions that define enactivist approaches to specific issues. The chapter includes a discussion of one of the main objections against enactivist and extended conceptions of cognition, the causal-constitution fallacy, and initiates a discussion of the role of representation and inference, especially in recent predictive coding approaches in neuroscience. It concludes by arguing that enactivism is best conceived as a philosophy of nature rather than a scientific research agenda.

Keywords:   enactivism, internalism, causal-constitution fallacy, representation, inference, predictive coding, philosophy of nature

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